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Abstract—Autonomous vehicles are capable of sensing their
environment and navigating without any human inputs. However,
when autonomous vehicles are involved in accidents between
themselves or with human subjects, liability must be indu-
bitably decided based on accident forensics. This paper proposes
a blockchain-inspired event recording system for autonomous
vehicles. Due to the inefficiency and limited usage of certain
blockchain features designed for the traditional cryptocurrency
applications, we design a new “proof of event” mechanism to
achieve indisputable accident forensics by ensuring that event
information is trustable and verifiable. Specifically, we propose a
dynamic federation consensus scheme to verify and confirm the
new block of event data in an efficient way without any central
authority. The security capability of the proposed scheme is also
analyzed against different threat and attack models.
I. INTRODUCTION
An autonomous vehicle (also known as driverless vehicle
or self-driving vehicle) is capable of sensing its environment
and navigating without any human input [1]. To facilitate self-
driving, autonomous vehicles adopt a variety of sensory tech-
nologies, such as lidar, camera, and ultrasound, to detect their
surroundings, and use a control system to interpret sensory
information to identify appropriate navigation paths, as well
as avoid obstacles and follow relevant traffic signs. Based on
a recent survey, roughly two-thirds of Americans expect cars
to be totally autonomous in the next half century [2].
However, with autonomy, comes accountability. When au-
tonomous vehicles are involved in accidents (collisions be-
tween themselves, or collisions with conventional vehicles,
pedestrians or other objects), how could such events be
recorded for forensic purposes to determine liability? In ad-
dition, how could such recorded events be verified, trusted,
and not tampered? Such issues become critical when there
exist incentives for different parties involved to tamper with
the recorded events to avoid punitive penalties. This paper
proposes a blockchain-inspired event recording scheme to help
autonomous vehicles achieve a tamper-proof and verifiable
event recording and forensics system.
A blockchain consists of a series of blocks, each of which is
composed of sets of timestamped transactions and a hash of its
previous blocks [3]. The original blockchain was designed for
Bitcoin, a digital cryptocurrency, to solve the double-spending
problem by using the Proof of Work (PoW) mechanism [4]. In
PoW, miners compete with one another to become the first to
solve a hash puzzle so as to obtain the right to generate the
next block and to receive incentives. However, PoW usually
takes 10 minutes to solve a puzzle and generate a new block.
Due to the computational difficulty of the current PoW, miners
tend to form bigger mining pools to conduct PoW [5], which
diminishes one original feature of being decentralized.
In our proposed event recording system, accidents are
recorded as timestamped transactions which are to be saved
into a new block in real-time. Although autonomous vehicles
may be equipped with reasonable computing capacity, con-
ducting PoW to save the event of an accident in real-time will
not be feasible due to the complexity of solving a hash puzzle.
To address this critical issue, we propose the mechanism
of Proof of Event with Dynamic Federation Consensus to
record accident events in a new block. When an accident
occurs, vehicles directly involved in the accident broadcast
‘event generation’ requests (via IEEE 802.11p [DSRC], for
instance), which only those vehicles within the (DSRC) com-
munication range will receive and respond. Then, both the
vehicles directly involved in the accident and those vehicles
receiving the request will generate and broadcast the event into
a ‘vehicular network’ which is defined based on the existing
cellular network infrastructure. Within the vehicular network, a
random federation group is formed to verify and save the event
data into a new block by using a multi-signature scheme [6].
And finally the generated new block will be sent and saved
in Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) for the permanent
records.
The mechanism of Proof of Event with Dynamic Federation
Consensus records events for indisputable accident forensics
and protects data integrity and trustworthiness by utilizing
event data from multiple sources and the generated hash
digest. The recorded events also provide traceable evidence.
Specifically, the proposed Dynamic Federation Consensus
scheme replaces the role of PoW in the original blockchain
to confirm and save a new block in a fast and effective way
without incurring extensive computation. As a federation is
dynamically formed around each accident over a vehicular
network, the consensus on the authenticity of the generated
events can be recorded in a flexible and robust manner.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Related
work is described in Section II. In Section III, we present
the cellular network-based vehicular network and describe
the mechanism of Proof of Event with Dynamic Federation
Consensus. In addition to normal cases, ‘extreme’ accident
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scenarios are discussed in Section IV. In Section V, we analyze
the security of the proposed scheme against potential attacks.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Event Data Recorders
An event data recorder (EDR), a vehicle equivalent of a
plane’s flight recorder or “black box,” is installed in vehicles
to record information related to crashes or accidents [7]. Some
EDRs continuously record data until a crash or accident stops
them, and others are activated by crash-like events (such as a
sudden decrease in velocity) and may continue to record until
the accident is over, or until the recording time expires [7].
Due to its individual and independent installation, once an
EDR is damaged or malfunctions, there is no chance to restore
or verify the information stored.
Heijden et al. [8] proposed a distributed ledger that provides
accountability for both misbehavior authorities and vehicles.
The goal is to reduce the requirements of trust on users of
vehicular communication systems and to create accountability
for misbehavior authorities via hierarchical consensus and
global revocation. In contrast, our work focuses on accident
forensics for autonomous vehicles. By employing the mecha-
nism of Proof of Event with Dynamic Federation Consensus,
accident events are stored in a trustable, verifiable, and tamper-
proof manner.
B. Blockchain-based Vehicular Systems
Yuan et al. [9] proposed a secured and decentralized
blockchain-based autonomous intelligent transportation sys-
tems with better usage of infrastructures and resources. A
case study is presented to describe a blockchain-based real-
time ride-sharing system. By using Ethereums smart con-
tract system. Leiding et al. [10] proposed a self-managed
and decentralized system to deploy and run any type of
application on vehicular ad-hoc networks without a central
managing authority. By using a blockchain-based public key
infrastructure, Rowan et al. [11] proposed a novel inter-
vehicle session key establishment protocol to secure vehicle-
to-vehicle communications through visible light and acoustic
side-channels. However, none of the work took inspiration
from blockchain to design an accident forensics system for
autonomous vehicles.
C. Consensus Methods
As consensus is critical to the decentralized nature of bloc-
chain, we review existing consensus schemes to highlight our
unique contribution. In the current state-of-the-art, PoW [12],
Proof of Stake (PoS) [13], and Proof of Authority (PoA) [14]
and several other Proof of ‘X’ consensus models all rely on
selecting one single peer to produce the new block. However,
these consensus models gradually deviate from the original
goals of decentralization and democratization. For instance,
one single peer is selected by nonce lottery via mining as with
PoW, by random selection among the largest stake holders
as with PoS [15], and by random selection among nodes via
one centralized authority as with PoA. Therefore, large mining
pools centralize authorities of Bitcoin, PoS concentrates power
in the hands of few peers based on their balance, and PoA
leaves the decision of which entities can generate new blocks
in the network to one central authority [15]. Thus, all of these
models have been falling short of their initial goals. In contrast,
the mechanism of Proof of Event with Dynamic Federation
Consensus proposed in this paper addresses the dynamic and
autonomous nature of self-driving vehicles so that the accident
forensic information could be validated by a federation than
one single individual.
III. ARCHITECTURE OF RECORDING SYSTEM
A. Cellular Network-based Vehicular Network
We adopt a cellular network-based infrastructure to define
a ‘vehicular network’ for each accident, where all the vehicles
covered by the same base station (i.e., within the same cell) of
the vehicles directly involved in an accident form a ‘vehicle
network’ as depicted in Fig. 1. We also assume that all
the autonomous vehicles register with an authority, such as
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), using license plate and
VIN number.
Vehicles use the IEEE 802.11p standard of Dedicated Short-
Range Communications (DSRC) [16] to send and receive
‘event generation’ requests. Meanwhile, vehicles are con-
nected to a cellular network to broadcast and confirm event
data within the corresponding vehicular network so as to create
new blocks.
Base Station
Fig. 1: Cellular network-based ‘vehicular’ network.
B. Proof of Event with Dynamic Federation Consensus
To facilitate forensic investigation after an accident, one
issue is the correctness and trustworthiness of the recorded
data, as vehicles involved, both directly and as bystanders,
might have incentives to alter accident related information
to avoid punitive penalties. Therefore, it is critical to record
authenticated event data at the specific time and location of the
accident. The recorded information about the accident could
later be retrieved and cross-examined to determine liability. It
can provide the consensus on whether an event is verifiable
and trustworthy at the certain geographic location and time.
We propose the following two steps to accomplish the goal:
Cellular communication
 DSRC communication
 Accident vehicle
 Witness vehicle
Community vehicle
C
B
D
A
E
A’s record
Location = xx, xx
Speed = ….
Angle = ….
EDR info...
B’s record
Location = xx, xx
Speed = ….
Angle = ….
C’s record
Location = xx, xx
Speed = ….
Angle = ….
D’s record
Location = xx, xx
Speed = ….
Angle = ….
E’s record
Location = xx, xx
Speed = ….
Angle = ….
             …...
             
F
G
Fig. 2: After an accident, both accident and witness vehicles generate and broadcast event data.
first to gather trustable event data from both vehicles directly
involved in the accident and neighboring vehicles, then to ver-
ify and save event data with the help of a dynamically formed
federation of vehicles within the same vehicular network.
1) Gathering event data: Vehicles directly involved in an
accident are termed “accident” vehicles, vehicles within the
DSRC transmission range from the accident scene are termed
“witness” vehicles, and vehicles within the same cell but
outside the DSRC transmission range from the accident scene
are termed “community” vehicles. To record the event of
an accident, upon the occurrence of an accident, “accident”
vehicles send ‘event generation’ requests to “witness” vehicles.
Fig. 2 depicts a scenario, where vehicles A and B got into an
accident. “Witness” vehicles C, D, and E within the DSRC
transmission range from the accident scene receive the event
generation requests and confirm with the “accident” vehicles
via DSRC. Fig. 4 depicts these sequence of events over time.
Location 
EDR records
Timestamp
SHA-256 Hashing   Hash Digest
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Fig. 3: Hash digest of event data.
Then, both “accident” and “witness” vehicles generate their
respective event data with their own locations, EDR records
(which capture histories of sensor readings around the accident
scene), timestamps and the corresponding hash digests (as
computed in Fig. 3), and broadcast their event data via cellular
communications within the vehicular network under the same
cell. All the broadcast event data from both “accident” and
“witness” vehicles will be verified and saved in a new block
by a federation to be described next.
2) Verifying and creating new block of accident event:
Upon the occurrence of an accident, “accident” vehicles also
broadcast, via cellular communication, ‘federation formation’
requests to the “community” vehicles in the vehicular network
to start the selection of a subset of “community” vehicles
as “verifier” vehicles to form a federation. Such a selection
process can be based on the notion of a reputation score which
may be determined based on a vehicle’s driving and reporting
records. Also the “verifier” vehicle with the highest reputation
score is designated as the lead verifier via a distributed leader
election algorithm [17], who is responsible for generating a
new block for the accident. After that, new block generated
by lead verifier vehicle will be sent to DMV and kept for the
permanent records.
As depicted in Fig. 4, after the “accident” and “witness”
vehicles generate and broadcast event data into the vehicular
network, “verifier” vehicles take the responsibility of validat-
ing the received event data against the received hash digests,
and confirm with the lead “verifier” vehicle (I in Fig. 4).
The lead “verifier” vehicle executes the n-of-m multi-signature
scheme [6] to achieve federation consensus when n out of
m “verifier” vehicles confirm, and generates a new block of
accident event. The lead “verifier” vehicle may then broadcast
Request Reply Broadcast Verify Generate and replicate new block
Witness C 
Lead Verifier I 
Verifier J 
Accident
      Approve 
      Approve 
      Approve 
Witness D 
Witness E 
Community F 
Community G 
Verifier H
Accident B 
Accident A 
Fig. 4: Sequence diagram for accident, witness, community, and verifier vehicles.
the new block to all the “community” vehicles.
Compared to PoW, our solution does not incur any expen-
sive computation associated with mining. Unlike PoA, which
relies on the decision of one single authority, our solution
demands confirmations from multiple authorities, if the n-of-
m multi-signature [6] threshold is satisfied, verifier vehicles
approve the event records and generate a new block. Every
new block has its hash header and linked with the previous
block’s hash header. For instance, as depicted in Fig. 5, block
i is verified by 3 out of 4 verifier vehicles from federation,
while the block i+1 is 3 out of 5 case.
Previous Hash (Block i-1) Previous Hash (Block i)
Proof of Event
A’s record B’s record
Block i Block i+1
Proof of Event
I’s record M’s record
✓
✓
✓
Federation
✓
✓
✓
Federation
Fig. 5: Each block contains event data and hash value of
previous block, and all confirmed by the verifier vehicles from
the federation.
Note that “witness” vehicles (C, D, and E) function differ-
ently from “verifier” vehicles (H, I, and J). The job of the
former is to generate event data, while that of the latter is to
verify event data and generate a new block of accident event.
“Witness” vehicles are close to the accident scene, whose EDR
records may contain sensory readings related to the “accident”
vehicles. In contrast, “verifier” vehicles are dynamically cho-
sen which are located at random geographical locations within
the same cell, even away from the accident scene, which makes
them to be more neutral and independent. The decoupling of
event data generations from their verification process mitigates
the possibility of any malicious activities, such as tampering
of event data and collusion among vehicles.
C. Incentives for participation and honesty
Bitcoin supplies new bitcoins to miners as an incentive
for their efforts of PoW [4]. However, there is no obvious
tangible award in the proposed Proof of Event. To motivate
autonomous vehicles to participate as either “witness” or
“verifier”, different incentives (or rewards) must be defined.
For instance, being a “witness” or “verifier” could raise a
vehicle’s credit score and to lower its insurance premium.
Also, “accident” vehicles that engage reliably in Proof of
Event and cooperate fully in accident forensics may receive a
reduced liability.
D. Reviewing blocks for accident forensics
Later, people (police or judge) can review the accident event
data stored in the blockchain from the DMV’s record. If there
is no discrepancy between event data generated by “accident”
and “witness” vehicles, liability can be clearly determined.
Otherwise, further investigation becomes necessary. For in-
stance in Fig. 2, if “accident” vehicle B reported its own
speed as 20 mph, while other “witness” vehicles (C, D, and E)
reported higher speeds for B, it is highly likely that “accident”
vehicle B had a faulty speed sensor which caused it to speed
and collided with vehicle A.
IV. EXTREME SCENARIOS
Our proposed mechanism works the best in accident sce-
narios where the density of the cell-based vehicular network
covering the accident scene is above a certain threshold. In
such cases, there are enough “witness” to generate event data
vehicles and enough “verifier” vehicles to form a federation,
reach a consensus, and create a new block. However, there
exists the following three ‘extreme’ scenarios when such
vehicular network is very sparse or no vehicle around the
accident scene.
(1) Neither “witness” nor “verifier” vehicle exists for an
accident. Since there is no “witness” or “verifier” vehicle, no
new block could be generated. The EDRs of the “accident”
vehicles will be the only evidence for forensic investigation.
(2) No “witness” vehicle exists for an accident. A new block
will be created based on the event data generated only by the
“accident” vehicles.
(3) No “verifier” vehicle exists for an accident. In this case,
there exists (few) “witness” vehicles around the accident scene,
but no “verifier” vehicle within the vehicular network. We
argue that such scenarios will be extremely rare in practice.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the robustness of the proposed
event recording scheme with respect to potential attacks.
A. Spoofing event data
Existing EDRs installed on individual vehicles may be
hacked and tampered to avoid liability. Our proposed Proof
of Event scheme have both “accident” and “witness” vehicles
generate event data which is to be validated by an independent
group of “verifier” vehicles to avoid possibility of collusion.
The recored event data in the block could be cross-examined
later to determine cause and liability.
Further, the use of DSRC communications range limits
which vehicles could serve as witness, which prevents vehicles
away from the accident scene to generate any ‘fake’ event data.
B. Impersonation attack
As mentioned in Section III-A, legitimate autonomous ve-
hicles are required to register with DMV. A malicious vehicle
may impersonate a reputable vehicle so as to be selected
as a “verifier” vehicle. Unless there are enough number of
colluding vehicles selected within the same federation, the use
of n-of-m multi-signature scheme to approve a new block is
to lower the possibility of invalidate consensus.
C. Fake witness vehicle attack
As mentioned before, ‘event generation’ requests are broad-
cast via DSRC so that only the “witness” vehicles, which
receive such request, can generate event data. However, a
“witness” vehicle might resend the ‘event generation’ request
to other vehicles which are beyond the range of DSRC
communication, and ‘invite’ them to respond. Such act may
launch the fake “witness” vehicle attack, where fake “witness”
vehicles generate the fake event data in favor of “accident”
vehicles. One possible solution to prevent such attacks is to
set a small time window for “witness” vehicles to reply and
broadcast event data.
VI. CONCLUSION
As autonomous systems are becoming essential parts of our
life, proper systems must be put in place to “look after” them
so as to determine liability from malfunctions, defects, or even
malicious attacks. By drawing inspiration from blockchain,
this paper presents a novel approach to providing a tamper-
proof and verifiable event recording system for accident foren-
sics of self-driving vehicles as they are the most influential
autonomous systems in our society. In future, we plan to
evaluate our proposed scheme using an experimental testbed.
REFERENCES
[1] S. K. Gehrig and F. J. Stein, “Dead reckoning and cartography using
stereo vision for an autonomous car,” in Intelligent Robots and Systems,
1999. IROS’99. Proceedings. 1999 IEEE/RSJ International Conference
on, vol. 3. IEEE, 1999, pp. 1507–1512.
[2] Pew Research Center, http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/10/04/americans-
attitudes-toward-driverless-vehicles/.
[3] J. Dilley, A. Poelstra, J. Wilkins, M. Piekarska, B. Gorlick, and
M. Friedenbach, “Strong federations: An interoperable blockchain solu-
tion to centralized third party risks,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1612.05491,
2016.
[4] F. Tschorsch and B. Scheuermann, “Bitcoin and beyond: A technical
survey on decentralized digital currencies,” IEEE Communications Sur-
veys & Tutorials, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 2084–2123, 2016.
[5] I. Eyal, “The miner’s dilemma,” in Security and Privacy (SP), 2015
IEEE Symposium on. IEEE, 2015, pp. 89–103.
[6] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Multisignature.
[7] “Event data recorder,” 2017. [Online]. Available: https://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Event data recorder
[8] R. W. van der Heijden, F. Engelmann, D. Mo¨dinger, F. Scho¨nig, and
F. Kargl, “Blackchain: Scalability for resource-constrained accountable
vehicle-to-x communication,” CoRR, vol. abs/1710.08891, 2017.
[9] Y. Yuan and F.-Y. Wang, “Towards blockchain-based intelligent trans-
portation systems,” in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), 2016
IEEE 19th International Conference on. IEEE, 2016, pp. 2663–2668.
[10] B. Leiding, P. Memarmoshrefi, and D. Hogrefe, “Self-managed and
blockchain-based vehicular ad-hoc networks,” in Proceedings of the
2016 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous
Computing: Adjunct. ACM, 2016, pp. 137–140.
[11] S. Rowan, M. Clear, M. Gerla, M. Huggard, and C. M. Goldrick, “Secur-
ing vehicle to vehicle communications using blockchain through visible
light and acoustic side-channels,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.02553,
2017.
[12] M. Jakobsson and A. Juels, “Proofs of work and bread pudding
protocols,” in Proceedings of the IFIP TC6/TC11 Joint Working
Conference on Secure Information Networks: Communications and
Multimedia Security, ser. CMS ’99. Deventer, The Netherlands, The
Netherlands: Kluwer, B.V., 1999, pp. 258–272. [Online]. Available:
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=647800.757199
[13] P. Vasin, “Blackcoins proof-of-stake protocol v2,” URL:
https://blackcoin. co/blackcoin-pos-protocol-v2-whitepaper. pdf, 2014.
[14] S. De Angelis, L. Aniello, R. Baldoni, F. Lombardi, A. Margheri, and
V. Sassone, “Pbft vs proof-of-authority: applying the cap theorem to
permissioned blockchain,” 2017.
[15] http://www.ubiquicoin.com/assets/proof.pdf.
[16] D. Jiang, V. Taliwal, A. Meier, W. Holfelder, and R. Herrtwich, “De-
sign of 5.9 GHz DSRC-based vehicular safety communication,” IEEE
Wireless Communications, vol. 13, no. 5, 2006.
[17] H. Attiya and J. Welch, Distributed computing: fundamentals, simula-
tions, and advanced topics. John Wiley & Sons, 2004.
